Reports.
Strategic Pressure: A Blueprint for Addressing New Threats and Supporting Democratic Change in the DRC
26/07/2017
Nearly nine months
after signing a political deal aimed at ushering in a landmark democratic transition
in the Democratic Republic of Congo, President Joseph Kabila’s subversion of
the accord places Congo at risk of much greater violence. It is also now
creating the potential for regional instability and the possible disruption in
the supply of minerals strategically important to U.S. national security and to
U.S. and other global manufacturers.
Kabila’s attempt to
stay in power at all costs is moving Congo from a fragile democracy to a
dictatorship. It has already sparked significant repression, caused armed
conflict in the Kasai region where 1.4 million people have been displaced, and
all major U.S. companies with direct investments have fled Congo. Unrest that
is rising in several areas of the country could also spread to mineral-rich
Katanga, where 50 to 60 percent of the world’s cobalt reserves lie, creating a
threat to U.S. defense, auto, and electronics industries.
A much more robust
strategy is needed to prevent a far costlier disaster with U.S. national
security and regional instability implications, and to help Congo move toward a
democratic transition. Over the past year, the international community as well
as Congo’s opposition and civil society have deployed some elements of a
necessary strategy of pressure and negotiation to support a transition.
However, those measures have not nearly been applied at the level needed to
change the calculations of Kabila and his inner circle sufficiently to motivate
them to move forward with credible elections. There is international pressure,
but it is too individualized, ad hoc, and not focused enough on squeezing the
regime at its most vulnerable point: the global financial system that Kabila
and his associates heavily rely on to move money.
A mediation effort
led by Congo’s Catholic bishops succeeded in getting the Dec. 31, 2016, accord
signed, but it failed afterward because of a lack of subsequent pressure on the
Kabila regime for implementation, and because the process did not include civil
society. A new, inclusive, African-led mediation initiative is needed once more
pressure has been applied.
This power grab by
President Kabila and his Congolese and international collaborators is driven by
their desire to not cede the immunity and control over the estimated $24
trillion in natural resource wealth that state authority gives them. They want
to continue profiting from the violent kleptocracy they inherited and have
refined over the past 16 years, through a system in which the ruling networks
and their commercial partners hijack the state for their own benefit and use
violence to profit and maintain power. The situation has become increasingly
dangerous, as Kabila has attempted to repress and divide the opposition and
civil society, and the government and opposition are no longer in dialogue.
Neighboring Angola and Uganda are very concerned about Kabila’s lack of control
of the situation, and the son-in-law of Angolan president José Eduardo dos
Santos, Sindika Dokolo, has launched a campaign for Congolese people to stand
up for democracy, supporting a Congolese civil society-opposition manifesto
published in August calling for a “return of constitutional order.” In a
country awash in arms, escalating local conflicts, angry politicians, youth,
and with neighboring countries growing increasingly concerned, the risks of
wider violence are high unless an inclusive transition occurs.
An effective
strategy to bring Congo back from the brink should focus on achieving a
democratic transition to begin to break the cycle of the corrupt, violent state
while also pushing for key structural reforms and immediate conflict mitigation
steps in the Kasai region and the east. It is not yet in the regime’s interest
to pursue a transition given the immense profits reaped by the Kabila family
and their commercial partners despite the economic crisis, Kabila’s control
over the security services, and the opposition’s current weakness.
Significantly increased financial and diplomatic pressures on the regime and
its partners are needed first, or else talks will be fruitless. The international
community, regional states, and the private sector should work on four tracks
to support Congolese efforts:
- Use financial pressure to change the Kabila regime’s cost-benefit calculations to hold a democratic transition. The United States and European states should enact a series of escalated anti-money laundering measures and targeted sanctions against networks of senior members of the regime and companies they control. U.S. and E.U. sanctions helped lead to the signing of the Dec. 31 deal, but the pressure needs to shift to more senior targets that would affect Kabila’s thinking: financial advisors, Kabila family members, their companies, and key banking transactions. Their reliance on the U.S. dollar, euro, and international banks creates major leverage for the United States and Europe. The aim of the pressure should be to lead to a breakthrough on the transition.
- As more pressure is applied, support negotiations to create a path to credible, timely elections and Kabila’s exit from the Presidency.Negotiations will eventually be necessary to prevent wider violence and for the government, opposition, and civil society to work out a plan for elections and a political transition in line with the Dec. 31 accord and/or the civil society manifesto, and to ensure that Kabila leaves office before elections. An independent African mediator trusted by all sides should be appointed to help broker a time-bound transition plan that is supported by Angola and neighboring states. Civil society groups must be included in talks, and the United States and United Nations should increase legal services and physical protection for civil society. Credible elections should occur as soon as possible.
- Enact targeted measures to help resolve conflict in Kasai and eastern Congo. This should include work to cut off the conflict gold trade through targeted sanctions on conflict gold smuggling networks in Congo and neighboring countries as well as support for accountability measures and investigations in Kasai.
- Combat corruption by pushing for transparency reforms of state-owned mining companies. The United States and European Union should use financial pressure until independent audits of the state-owned mining company Gécamines are conducted and those audits are published. Technology and mining firms should also press the regime because they indirectly work with Gécamines. This is directly tied to the electoral quagmire, as these companies are at the heart of how Kabila’s inner circle generates illicit wealth and why it wants to stay in power.
This strategy would
strongly support Congolese civil society’s courageous advocacy for a democratic
transition: e.g., 195 Congolese human rights and other civil society groups
recently called for increased sanctions on the regime. As a leading Congolese
female civil society activist told Enough, “With all the evidence in [recent
reports and news articles] that we learn about, why aren’t the E.U. and the
U.S. targeting Zoe Kabila or Jaynet Kabila to send a strong signal to Joseph
Kabila that he must get his act together and abide for once in his tenure to an
agreement like the December 2016 one?”
The private sector
also has a major role to play. This includes U.S. and other global electronics,
jewelry, and automotive companies that use Congo’s minerals, as well as
multinational banks that provide financing for projects in Congo or act as
correspondent banks for U.S. dollar transactions related to Congo. It is in the
interest of these corporations to avoid potential money laundering and sourcing
of conflict minerals and to help prevent a violent crisis that would make doing
business in Congo much more difficult. The private sector can and should cut
off corrupt correspondent bank accounts, create demand for Congo’s conflict-free
gold, and press the Congolese government to make state-owned mining companies
more transparent. The U.S. government and European Union should engage
companies on these issues.
Four key developments in Congo
make the deployment of this strategy timely: 1) The Dec. 31 deal signed by the
government and opposition offers a clear roadmap and benchmarks for a
democratic transition; 2) There is now a near consensus in the international
community and Congolese civil society that the Kabila regime is thwarting
democracy and stability, and Angola plus several African former heads of
state have joined that consensus; 3) Significant further financial leverage is
available to influence the process which has not yet been utilized, and the
regime’s leaders and business partners could lose access to the global banking
system if that financial pressure is applied by governments and banks; 4) The
powerful Catholic Church in Congo, which helped negotiate the Dec. 31 accord,
is now telling the population to stand up to the regime, combined with
increasing activism by Congolese pro-democracy civil society. This means that
there is new space for democratic resistance to the regime, as many Congolese
were previously waiting while the bishops negotiated, providing further
internal pressure on the government.
Take Action Now: Send a Tweet to US Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley asking
her to support increased financial pressure on corrupt Congolese officials and
their international facilitators until democratic elections occur.
Please click on the following to send a a Tweet to US Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley.
Enough Project
