Washington Throws Its Conditional Support Behind the Congo's New Leader
13/04/2019
Highlights
- Recent
high-level meetings between Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi and U.S.
officials signal Washington's willingness to work with the new
administration in exchange for deep reforms and efforts to dismantle
former President Joseph Kabila's networks of power.
- Tshisekedi,
however, will have little room to maneuver due to the dominance of the
Kabila system, as well as the lack of clarity about how much Washington
will support the new president.
- Amid
his difficult balancing act, Tshisekedi stands a high chance of falling out
with either Kabila or Washington, raising the likelihood that he could
lose power.
The United States is turning over a new leaf with a troubled
African giant. New Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi visited Washington last
week in a sign that his hosts are willing to reset relations after a controversial
election. The move makes sense: For Washington, Tshisekedi's election marks
a potential turning point in the history of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, an important country that has abundant mineral resources, as well as
profound security and economic challenges. But despite enthusiastic talk of
bolstering ties between Washington and the new administration, the elephant in
the room remains former President Joseph Kabila, who could yet scuttle
Tshisekedi's plans for a new Congo.
Conditional Support
Following a sit-down between U.S. Secretary of State Mike
Pompeo and Tshisekedi, the State Department declared its support for the
Congolese president's "change agenda," citing the Tshisekedi
administration's ambitious, albeit vague, pledges to tackle graft more aggressively,
improve security and strengthen the Congolese government's commitment to human
rights. While clearly conditioned on reform, the U.S. declaration of support
was notable in and of itself, as Washington had previously slapped sanctions on
senior officials of Congo's electoral commission, the body that oversaw the
country's contested elections at the end of 2018. In the sanctions document,
the United States accused the polling officials of corruption and "failing
to ensure the vote reflected the will of the Congolese people."
Washington, consequently, has found itself in an ambivalent position: On the
one hand, it emphasized that it believes Congo's
election was flawed — or even rigged — yet it also indicated its
willingness to work closely with the new administration in Kinshasa, the
capital, in the hopes of bolstering security and economic ties.
For Tshisekedi, the pledge of American support is most
welcome. Since assuming office three months ago, the president has found
himself boxed in at almost every turn by Kabila's clique, which holds a
majority in the National Assembly and the Senate, rules the vast majority of
the provinces, controls the security services and possesses a large degree of
wealth. Accordingly, Washington's support will be instrumental if Tshisekedi is
to carve out greater room to maneuver in such a stifling environment.
In such a situation, two immediate questions arise. First,
how far can the new president actually go in his agenda of change? There are
likely clear red lines in the relationship between Tshisekedi and Kabila,
especially in the mining
industry, where Kabila and his allies have massive stakes, but the rest of
their relationship might be more fluid. In fact, Kabila's Common Front for
Congo (FCC) rebuked Tshisekedi after the latter told Washington he would work to
"dismantle the dictatorial system that was in place" — underscoring
that the working arrangement between the incumbent and his predecessor might
only be skin deep.
Second, how much weight will Washington bear to tip the
scales in favor of Tshisekedi? Washington wishes to see reforms in Congo, but
it's unclear whether the United States will benefit enough from regulatory
changes to justify wide-ranging help. In fact, the recent sanctioning of
election officials could signal that U.S. officials are willing to target some
Kabila-linked figures, but it is unclear if there are other tools that
Washington is willing to use to forcibly accelerate the dismantling of the
Kabila system.
But if Washington is hitching its wagon to Tshisekedi in the
hopes that he will overhaul Congo's political and economic system by
dismantling the "dictatorial system" and streamlining the regulatory
environment (specifically in the mining sector), then it might be in for a
letdown. Though Tshisekedi secured the release of hundreds of political
prisoners — something American officials excitedly touted as evidence of
Congo's new direction — the move was within the new leader's presidential
prerogatives, which are very limited. For example, while reports surfaced that
Tshisekedi rejected Kabila's choice of Albert Yuma as prime minister
(reportedly because of Yuma's corruption as head of Gecamines, the state-owned
mining company), he is still obliged to pick a candidate from the parliamentary
majority, which is held by the FCC and, therefore, Kabila. And in worse news
for Tshisekedi, Kabila's coalition will be able to name the Senate's next
president, who will be next in line for the presidency should Tshisekedi suddenly
fall. This leverage, combined with Kabila's dominance of the political
spectrum, means Tshisekedi will need to operate within the authority of his
narrow powers if he is to achieve any of his goals.
A Tinderbox?
Amid these curbs on Tshisekedi's power, there could be even
more signs of trouble down the road, complicating his ability to govern and
Washington's ability to get a return on its backing for the new leader. Reports
suggest that people in many parts of the country believe the Dec. 30 election
was rigged to perpetuate the Kabila system, regardless of the new face at the
top of the pyramid. Apart from Kabila and his cabal, Tshisekedi could thus face
major resistance from ordinary citizens who refuse to accept his presidency.
If Washington is hitching its wagon to Tshisekedi in the
hopes he will overhaul Congo's political and economic system, then it might be
in for a letdown.
In time, Tshisekedi may also face growing discontent from
within the ranks of his Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) party.
While some influential party members have seemingly acceded to Tshisekedi's
surprise election victory, they could launch an internal backlash if reforms
and other signs of an opening fail to materialize in the months or years ahead.
For example, Tshisekedi’s recent decision to appoint Roger Kibelisa, the former
head of the notorious National Intelligence Agency (ANR), as a security adviser
irked many opposition figures, who say they suffered directly at the hands of
Kibelisa and the ANR. (Kibelisa, incidentally, is one of 14 Congolese officials
subject to European Union sanctions). If Tshisekedi appointed Kibelisa out of a
realization that he needs more Kabila insiders working for him — in the hopes
of one day neutralizing the coterie down the line — then his plans will clash
with UDPS members and others who abhor the idea of embracing elements of the
country's repressive old guard.
A foretaste of this potential backlash occurred in mid-March
following allegations of widespread bribery during senatorial elections, in
which Kabila's allies grabbed a huge majority in the upper house of parliament.
The results left Tshisekedi's party weak, even in its traditional base of
Kinshasa, roiling UDPS members and provoking them to protest. Facing anger
within the ranks, Tshisekedi moved to block senators from taking their seats,
citing allegations of widespread bribery. But within days, Tshisekedi relented,
as an investigation ostensibly exonerated the accused, thereby underscoring the
president's willingness to cave to the status quo around him. Tshisekedi, too,
has displayed his pliant nature in the case of the mining sector, where he has
continued on from Kabila in backing increased taxes on foreign mining
companies.
As Tshisekedi walks the tightrope in his attempt to stay in
line with the onerous expectations of his predecessor and appease his base and
Washington, the potential that he will fail is high. But regardless of which
side turns on Tshisekedi first, the new president faces a difficult political
road ahead as the old system fights for survival at a time when new reforms
have yet to take root.
Assessment by Stratfor
